Civilian Oversight Of Police In Nigeria
Corporate governance seeks to determine the
process of management in an organisation and its integrity. It seeks to ensure
organisations are open and transparent, and that there are correct rules and
procedures in place to make them accountable. Peculiar to the public sector it
questions the robustness of an organisation i.e. whether there is good
management/governance in the organisation. As Ranson and Stewart (1994) point
out public sector organisations have to operate under other dimensions of
accountability than organisations in the private sector. The public sector has
a general and ultimate responsibility for services affecting people’s lives,
hence these organisations are expected to provide services which meet high
standards of ethical norms and transparency which, according to Bruijn and
Ringeling (1997:153), could be more important than considerations of
effectiveness and functionality. The outcome of services is important for
accountability, but so also is the way they have been delivered and
administered.
Accountability is a core concept of
corporate governance. The Cadbury Report (1992) combines a statement of
principles of good governance with a code of best practice. It began with a
narrow basic identification of the principles of good governance as integrity,
openness and accountability. This report was based on corporate governance in
the private sector and in 1994 the Nolan Report focused on the principles of
public life. Public accountability for the delivery of services has
traditionally been concerned with the appropriate stewardship of inputs, but
more recently attention has extended towards a greater interest in outcomes.
Accountability in broad terms arises as part
of the process of delegation. There is a need for accountability when a
principal seeks an agent to do something on their behalf. The flow of resources
from the principle to agent results in a desire for a flow of accountability in
the opposite direction. Where there is a bad service there is likely to be a
problem with accountability. There is generally a long chain of principal-agent
relations, delegations and accountability mechanisms; hence, locating the
particular problem with accountability may not be straightforward.
There are several dimensions of and
frameworks for accountability. For example democracy and rule of law embody
frameworks for accountability. One of the most thorough, yet broad, definitions
of accountability, has been provided by Andreas Schedler (1999:13-14).
According to Schedler the “term
accountability … expresses the continuing concern for checks and oversight, for
surveillance and institutional constraint on the exercise of power”. Further
arguing that:
[T]he notion of political accountability
carries two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation of public
officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing; and enforcement,
the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who
have violated their public duties. This two-dimensional structure of meaning
makes the concept a broad and inclusive one that, within its wide and loose
boundaries, embraces (or at least overlaps with) lots of other terms –
surveillance, monitoring, oversight, control, checks, restraint, public exposure,
punishment – that we may employ to describe efforts to ensure that the exercise
of power is a ruled-guided enterprise.
Hence accountability, according to Schedler
“embraces three different ways of preventing and redressing abuse of political
power. It implies subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to
be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts”.
The concept of accountability has many
difficulties, and is surrounded by much controversy. Flinders (2001:13) in his
treatment of accountability simply sees it as “the condition of having to
answer to an individual body for one’s actions”. However the scope and meaning
of the word accountability has been extended beyond the core sense of being
called to account for one’s actions. It has been applied to internal aspects of
official behaviour, beyond the external focus implied by being called to
account; to institutions that control behaviour other than through calling
officials to account; to means of making officials responsive to public wishes
other than through calling them to account; and to democratic dialog between
citizens where no one is being called to account. (Mulgan 2000: 555). Mulgan
suggests that the issue of definition is not just about terminology but also
about institutional and administrative policy: about the relative emphasis
placed on external scrutiny: and sanctions, compared with other means of
securing the compliance of officials, in a complex democracy.
Police exist to guarantee order, safety and
security. In securing these, police exercise enormous power. According to
Goldstein (1977: 1), “The police, by the very nature of their function, are an
anomaly in a free society. They are invested with a great deal of authority
under a system of government in which authority is reluctantly granted, and
when granted, sharply curtailed. The specific form of their authority – to
arrest, to search, to detain, and to use force – is awesome in the degree to
which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden and
direct in its impact upon individual. And this awesome authority, of necessity,
is delegated to individuals at the lowest level of the bureaucracy, to be
exercised, in most instances without prior review and control”.
The police are primarily a social regulatory
agency and as such represent the state’s security interest in reserving social
order and ensuring public safety. Policing inherently involves social and
political judgments about social order that are biased in favour of the status
quo (Bayley 1985).
Accountability is not intended to eliminate
or undermine power but rather to control it from becoming an instrument of
repression and exploitation and to ensure that power is exercised in a
transparent manner, and according to rules. If the powers of the police are not
controlled and subjected to mechanisms of accountability, the rights and
freedom of citizens can be jeopardized.
The complex nature of accountability within
the police can reflected in its performance indicators. Police accountability
has been described as ‘a Babel of evaluative languages with little agreement
about which should be used and by whom where’ (Day and Klein 1987: 105)
Police Oversight
Discussions of police accountability tend to
be dominated by the controversy over whether mechanisms should be internal or
external. While there are several advantages and disadvantages for either
internal or external complaint review systems, police officials are usually
hostile to an external review board for several reasons including the following
as pointed out by Alemika (2003):
Police commanders argue that external review
boards undermine their authority and the confidence of their subordinates.
Police fear that individuals who do not
understand the peculiarities of police work, especially the dangers involved,
will sit in judgment over their conduct and actions.
Police fear that external review boards can
be used by citizens as a platform for retaliation or revenge for arrest and
prosecution, and for frustrating prosecution.
As a result of these and other
considerations, police officials are typically unreceptive to the idea of
having an external review board oversee police affairs. And of course the fears
of the police are not unwarranted as the points above are quite reasonable.
However, citizens do not usually have trust
in the internal administrative review procedures maintained by the police. The
following arguments are often campaigned against internal mechanisms of
oversight:
Police commanders are not enthusiastic about
uncovering and punishing misconduct among their officers and are therefore
likely to dismiss complaints without adequate investigation.
There is a great deal of solidarity between
officers, and rank and file that inhibits effective investigation leading to
substantiation of complaints.
Code of secrecy and silence in police
departments inhibit effective investigation.
Administrative review mechanisms within the
police are opaque and lack transparency.
Standards of proof used by police
authorities are subjective and favours police officers accused of wrongdoing.
There is often intimidation of and threats
against civilian complaint petitioners by police officers.
Complainants are not adequately informed
about how their complaints are being processed, and of the final decisions.
In contrast, citizens in favour of external
civilian review boards, associate them with several advantages including the
following:
Citizens have greater access to complaint
review boards.
Procedures for the intake and investigation
of complaints are more widely publicized and transparent;
The chances of intimidation are minimized.
It overcomes or minimizes the impact of code
of secrecy among officers and within police departments.
Legitimizes the police, as the process
portrays the police department as unobtrusive of investigation, and the
attribution of misconduct to “rotten apples” rather than “rotten police agency”
is sustained.
The relative strengths and weaknesses of
internal and external review, when fostered appropriately, can complement each
other, as many advocates of civilian oversight argue that there will never be
enough resources to support external oversight alone. David Bruce (REF?), a
researcher at the Centre for Studies in Violence and Reconciliation in South
Africa, believes this task is particularly important in emerging democracies
where police typically have very poor controls over their own behaviour and
external oversight mechanisms are generally under-funded. Rather than trying to
become an alternative to internal review, Bruce argues, oversight mechanisms
that operate outside the police should use their limited resources to help law
enforcement agencies establish systems to monitor and control their own
behaviour. The challenge, he adds, is to form civilian oversight mechanisms
that acknowledge and respect the expertise of police and the complex challenges
of fighting crime.
The issue of police accountability is a
serious matter in any society and its import has been captured in the phrases
‘who shall guard the guardians’ and ‘who shall police the police’. The two
phrases draw attention to the role of the police as guardians while at the same
time expressing the fears that guardians are not always benevolent and need to
be subject to monitoring. More substantively, the coercive power of the state
is routinely exercised by the police. No other public institution has the
opportunities as well as temptations to abuse power as the police. First those
who seek to abuse public power often require the collaboration or acquiescence
of the police. On their own, police are strategically placed within the vector
of power such that they may perform three different roles in the exercise and
abuse of power – repellent of abuse, instigator of abuse, and executor of
abuse. Therefore, police need to be subject to strong mechanisms of
accountability to public authorities and civil society. In Nigeria, there is
widespread concern about the performance, integrity and conduct of the Nigeria
police force. For example, the police are widely criticized for extra-judicial
killing, corruption, incivility, brutality and torture, non-response to
distress call by citizens. It must be emphasised that no police force can be
accountable if the government lacks accountability, as is the case in the
country. Alemika, E. O. (2003).
The critical issue as regards the focus of
this paper is where does Nigeria stand in terms of institutions, mechanisms and
procedures for holding police accountable? In general, the country has multiple
institutions for holding police accountable. There are external and internal
mechanisms of police accountability and discipline in Nigeria. The Police Act
and Police Regulations provided for internal disciplinary measures and
mechanisms in the Nigeria Police Force. And the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria established two external principal organs for the
control of the Nigeria Police Force. These are the Nigeria Police Council (NPC)
and the Police Service Commission (PSC).
The Nigeria Police Council
The 1999 Constitution established the
Nigeria Police Council, as was the case in the 1963 Constitution but omitted in
the 1979 Constitution. The Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution created the
Nigeria Police Council and the Police Service Commission. The Police Council
consists of:
the President who shall be the Chairman;
the Governor of each State of the
Federation;
the Chairman of the Police Service Commission;
and
the Inspector-General of Police.
The Constitution defined the functions of
the Police Council to include:
(a) the organisation and administration of
the Nigeria Police Force and all other matters relating thereto (not being
matters relating to the use and operational control of the Force or the
appointment, disciplinary control and dismissal of members of the force);
(b) the general supervision of the Nigeria
Police Force; and
(c) advising the President on the
appointment of the Inspector-General of Police.
Section 216(2) requires the President to
consult the Nigeria Police Council before making appointment to the office of
the Inspector-General of Police and before removing him or her. The state
governors constitute an overwhelming majority of the membership of the highest
organ of control of the Nigeria Police Force.
The Council as the highest organ of the
state responsible for the policy on organization and administration of police
in the country can be an important organ of police accountability. It can for
example act proactively by closely monitoring the reports on police by the
public, mass media and other civil society organizations and in that light
undertake annual evaluation of the Force with a view to dealing with structural
and organizational factors that engender police abuse of power. More important,
the Council can hold the police accountable for the implementation of policies
and programmes that it introduced. But as at present, there appears to be no
political will to establish strong mechanisms for accountability at this level.
It seems that the chairman of the Council treats it only as a ‘fire-brigade’
contraption available to the president for addressing his concern on security
and safety and for confirming his nominee for appointment into the office of
the Inspector-General. There is need for the Council to establish a strong and
effective office for policy development, and implementation. In that case, it
can hold the police accountable for the implementation of such roles. The
process of policy development should be broad-based including the legislature,
executive, judiciary and civil society. There is much to be done in this
direction as current police laws and regulations, except for minor amendments,
were formulated and enacted during colonial rule and more than five decades
ago.
Some of the responsibilities of the Council
has been delegated to the Minister of Police Affairs. However, the bureaucratic
structure of the Ministry gives the impression that its responsibilities are
limited to sourcing fund for the payment of salary and pension for the police
and for executing capital projects like building and renovating barracks,
purchasing vehicles, etc. The Ministry can potentially serve as an institution
for holding police accountable for allocated public fund, if it is on its own
part transparent. The Nigeria Police Council should discharge its
responsibility of making and supervising policing policies for the country, and
holding police accountable for their implementation of policies and programmes
and for the use of allocated resources.
Police Service Commission
In Nigeria the transition from military
dictatorship to democracy has required changing the image of the police from a
tool of an oppressive government to a public service agency. To facilitate this
shift, national lawmakers reconstituted the Police Service Commission. Most governments
have two unconnected agencies—one to punish misconduct and one to reward good
performance—but the commission has both responsibilities, making it unusual and
potentially a very effective form of civilian oversight. (Phillips & Trone,
2002)
The 1999 Constitution of the Federation also
provided for the establishment of the Police Service Commission with the
following members:
(a) Chairman; and
(b) such number of other persons, not less
than seven but not more than nine, as may be prescribed by an Act of the
National Assembly.
The Constitution stipulated that the
Commission shall have the power to-
(a) appoint persons to offices (other than
the office of the Inspector-General of Police) in the Nigeria Police Force; and
(b) dismiss and exercise disciplinary
control over persons holding any office referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of
this paragraph.
The Police Service Commission
(Establishment) Act, No. 15 of 2001, in Section 6 charged the Commission with
the responsibility of:
appointing and promoting all officials of
the NPF (other than the Inspector-General of Police , IGP);
dismissing and exercising disciplinary
control over the same persons;
formulating policies and guidelines for the
appointment, promotion, discipline and dismissal of officers of the NPF;
identifying factors inhibiting and
undermining discipline in the NPF;
formulating and implementing policies aimed
at efficiency and discipline within the NPF;
performing such other functions as, in the
opinion of the Commission are required to ensure optimal efficiency in the NPF;
and
Carrying out such other functions as the
President may from time to time direct.
The membership of the Commission includes
representatives of the human rights community, organized private sector, women
and the media as well as a retired justice of superior court of record. If
strengthened – organizationally, financially, materially and staff-wise – and
allowed to function as an independent organization as provided for by the Constitution,
the Police Service Commission will be one of the most powerful and autonomous
civilian oversight institutions for the police in the world. However, thus far,
the potential of the Commission has not been realized due to several factors.
Among them are the following:
Members are yet to grapple with the enormous
responsibilities of the Commission arising from constitutional and statutory
provisions above. Consequently, appropriate structures, directorates, policies
and guidelines are yet to be established;
The Commission has been very poorly funded
and this has constituted a serious limitation on its operations, including the
establishment of structures and directorates, and formulation of policies and
guidelines;
The power of the Commission to appoint,
promote and discipline cannot be effectively exercised, if there are no
reliable performance assessment guidelines as well as monitoring and
investigation personnel. The Commission is not intended to be simply a
bureaucratic contraption for merely legitimizing promotion by the police force
or pre-emptive actions of the presidency in relations to matters and powers
constitutionally assigned to it
As is the case, in many parts of the world,
the relationship between civilian oversight body and the police force is often
characterized by tension, suspicion and sometimes open hostility. The
Commission has an advantage in that unlike most of its counterparts in other
many countries, it has and exercises power of promotion and discipline. In many
countries, civilian oversight bodies only makes recommendations to the police
commandant for implementation but have no disciplinary power of their own. The
Commission and the Nigeria Police Force must find a common ground that enables
each to effectively and efficiently discharge its responsibilities, than is
currently the case.
The goal and ambition of the Police Service
Commission is to ensure that no comment by a member of the public on the
conduct of any police officer – whether to condemn or to commend – should simply
get “lost in the system”, but that each is considered and dealt with. It is
only then that Nigeria can truly begin to talk of true civilian oversight of
its police force. For in the final analysis, that oversight rests – not only
with the members of the Commission, but with the entire Nigerian public
Fundamental Human Rights Provisions
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria that came into effect on May 29, 1999 contained in chapter four a ‘Bill
of Rights’. Many of the provisions have bearing on the mechanism and processes
of police accountability. The Constitution guaranteed the rights to life and
dignity, prohibited torture and unusual punishment; guaranteed rights of
accused person to be presumed innocent until adjudged guilty by a competent
court, to due process, and to private property, etc. It also guaranteed freedom
of movement, religion and association, etc. These provisions, as indicated
above, represent pro-active mechanisms for accountability. They set limit on
the action of public authorities in their exercise of coercive powers and also
provide parameters for complaints against abuse of power by the police. The
potential benefits of these provisions have not been realized because of
widespread poverty that prevents aggrieved persons from taking civil action
against the police and there is yet no complaints review board that is
effective and accessible.
Security: compelling Urgent Trends Solomon
Asemota Esq. SAN 2006
The Nigerian Police, like any other Police
establishment in a Democracy, can only function under the Rule of Law. Rule of
Law places a restraint on individuals and on government providing limits.
Unfortunately, the Police cannot operate successfully where the rulers
vacillate from time to time and from one person to the other where crime is
defined but its application is selective. Crime and criminal propensity should
be the basis for police administration and operation not political convenience
or objective.
Contracts, performance measurement and
accountability in the public sector / . Amsterdam [etc.] : IOS Press, 2005
Civilian oversight
The central issue is how to strike a balance
between maintaining the independence of the police from political interference
and holding the police service accountable to the various levels of government
and the public. Two important mechanisms are aimed at accomplishing this:
governing police boards or associations and public complaint bodies. The
participation of civilians in both of these bodies is what has come to be known
as civilian oversight of police.
Is to create practical mechanisms for citizens
to routinely oversee and influence the conduct of law enforcement, including
the manner in which police exercise their powers to arrest, interrogate, and
use lethal and non-lethal force.
By definition, civilian oversight involves
people outside the police gaining access to previously non-public or secret
internal police processes in order to hold law enforcement accountable for its
actions, policies, and priorities. In practice, however, there is always a
division of responsibility between external review and law enforcement’s own
internal review systems.
there may even be aspects of the oversight
process that police departments are better equipped to handle than non-police
organizations. He observes, for example, that while agencies outside the police
can be capable of investigating low-level complaints, reviewing fatalities and
other serious incidents requires the greater resources, expertise, and
structure that a police agency’s internal affairs division offers. Yet because
it’s always difficult for any police officer to judge another officer—making
internal investigations susceptible to bias and distortion —Bobb argues that
these investigations in particular should be carefully reviewed and judged for
objectivity, thoroughness, and fairness by an agency or group operating outside
the police.
Both the police and the citizens must
continually strive to build mutual trust.
One ... stated that...In the United
Kingdom, this body is known and called Independent Police Complaints Commission
(IPCC). The function of this body should be to investigate police brutality,
abuse of their powers, discipline police personnel and punish were necessary.
This will be a kind of checks and balances on the Nigerian Police Force. The
membership of this body should be people of proven character. I suggest retired
judges and retired top civil servants etc. It will make the Nigerian Police to
be efficient in the discharge of their duties. This body should have offices in
all states of the federation.
for citizens to have the right to know what
the police are doing and to demand appropriate behaviour.
It is an effort to protect the fundamental
human rights of all citizens and to strengthen remedies when individuals
charged with enforcing the law and advancing public safety violate those
rights. In its most effective form, civilian oversight tries to achieve these
goals through collaboration between citizens and the police. Civilian oversight
can never substitute for good police leadership or displace internal methods of
fostering a culture of accountability and responsibility. By exposing police
practices, pointing out the shortcomings in how police regulate themselves,
reporting honestly on the depth and pace of police reform, and engaging the
public and the police in a dialogue, however, civilian oversight is a vital
part of democratic policing. More broadly, civilian oversight could become an
integral part of maintaining social order so that democratic political
processes can be conducted freely and lawfully.
The absence of an effective governmental
supervision and oversight of the public servants and their private sector
collaborators has meant that much reliance has been placed on police
investigation, prosecution and sanction of corruption under the Criminal and
Penal Code. Osipitan Taiwo and Oyelowo Oyewo. It must be noted that the
Nigerian Police that is primary charged with policing the State is openly
corrupt and ineffective in policing corruption. The Prosecution Units and
Office of Director of Public Prosecution are usually not independent and are
obviously under the influence of the executive. Not to mention the fact that
the judiciary in Nigeria is plagued with corruption and susceptible to
corrupting influence and miscarriage of justice.
Global Corruption Perspective Report 2007 of
Transparency International.
It is vital for the Police service to be
democratically accountable. It is important to realize that civilian oversight
is ultimately just one form of accountability among several that contribute to
the ideal for democratic policing. As Stone and Ward (2000) observe, there
exists in practice a number of complementary forms of police accountability,
including those to the public, the state and to the police themselves.
Accountability is probably best achieved when these processes work together and
reinforce one another. It is therefore important not to view civilian oversight
as providing all the answers to the problem of producing an accountable police
service, but as an important element. Alemika and Chukwuma (2003:43).
Findings
the public is not yet ready to accept police
officers as their servants and protectors.
While the Nigerian police are making efforts
to build trust between themselves and citizens for example,
.....................the process is slow. Indeed, it may be
the permanent lot of police in democracies that the public vacillates between
seeing the police at times as protectors and at other times as oppressors.
Chairman of the Nigerian Police Service
commission is an ex-inspector general of the police force..... in internal
administrative review procedures maintained by the police.
The following arguments are often canvassed
against the mechanism:
Police commandants are not enthusiastic
about uncovering and punishing misconduct among their officers and are
therefore likely to dismiss complaints without adequate investigation.
There is a great deal of solidarity between
officers, and rank and file that inhibits effective investigation leading to
substantiation of complaints;
Code of secrecy and silence in police
departments inhibit effective investigation
Administrative review mechanisms within the
police are opaque and lack transparency.
Standard of proof used by the police
authority is subjective and favours police officers accused of wrongdoing.
Intimidation of and threat against civilian
complainants by police officers.
Complainants are not adequately informed
about how their complaints are being processed, and of the final decisions.
Ayo Obe on the Police service commision...
Member, Police Service Commission
The Police Service Commission, established
under section 153 of the 1999 Constitution, is the very embodiment of the
concept of civilian oversight for the Nigeria Police Force. It is the
Commission which is responsible for the appointment, promotion, discipline and
dismissal of every police officer in Nigeria other than the Inspector-General
of Police. Of its seven members and Secretary, only one member is a retired
senior police officer. The rest come from the non-police sector of society. The
Act under which it is established goes further to specify that its members
should include a representative each of women, the Nigerian Press, Nigerian
human rights non-governmental organisations and the organised private sector.
But how meaningful can this laudable diversity of societal interests be, and
how much confidence can the public have in its decisions as to appointments,
promotions and discipline or dismissal if – at the end of the day – all the
members can do is to act on the recommendations of other policemen who –
however much they too may desire the creation of a respected police, and
however rigorous they may be in exacting discipline and obedience from their
juniors – are subject, or are perceived as being subject, to the camaraderie
and closed ranks seen as necessary for the maintenance of espirit de corps?
Of course, members of the public can and do
raise complaints against police officers. Cases of death or serious injury in police
custody or resulting from torture at the hands of investigating officers,
seizure of property, wrongful or malicious arrest, extortion and bribe-taking,
release of suspected criminals (who then turn round to terrorize those who
named them as suspects) – these have all been reported to the Nigeria Police
Force. But even cases taken up by non-governmental organisations and legal
practitioners are often left un-addressed and ignored in the expectation that
the complainant will eventually get tired. How much more complaints raised by
ordinary individual members of the public? And as noted above, how much
confidence can the public have when they feel that their views are in any
event, going to be considered (if at all) by fellow officers who – apart from having
enough on their plate to fully justify (in their own eyes at least) filing such
complaints away for consideration “at a later date” – may be all too ready to
sympathise with a colleague expected to perform wonders with meagre resources
and to build a secure house in which members of the public can sleep with both
eyes shut using bricks made without straw?
strong accountability and effective crime
fighting are viewed as conflicting goals.
Political leaders who must face these
decisions must often negotiate solutions to navigate across this difficult
terrain.
Conclusion
More must be done, however, to expand civil
society engagement. Civilian oversight is too often merely a principle rather
than actual practice.
Generally, the public is more satisfied with
complaints being investigated by an independent body rather than by the police
service itself. However, they were just as frustrated by backlogs and delays
whether the investigation was independent or not. Perhaps surprisingly,
complainants are not always seeking strict penalties against an officer. In
cases involving less serious examples of misconduct, complainants prefer a
genuine admission and an apology.
While more work is needed in developing
models for the governance and oversight of policing, there are practices that
show promise. Among these is civilian participation. We know that civilian
participation in police governance boards and independent complaint bodies
contributes to improving public confidence in police services.
